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Abstract 
This article considers the development and use of dispersal powers, introduced by the 
Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003, and situates these within the context of wider 
legislation and policy initiatives. It explores the ways in which the powers have been 
interpreted by the courts and implemented by police and local authorities. The article 
critically analyses the manner in which the powers: introduce „public perceptions‟ as a 
justification for police encroachments on civil liberties; conform to a hybrid-type 
prohibition; constitute a form of preventive exclusion that seeks to govern future 
behaviour; are part of a wider trend towards discretionary and summary justice; and 
potentially criminalise young people on the basis of the anxieties that groups 
congregating in public places may generate amongst others. It is argued that the 
significance of dispersal orders derives as much from the symbolic messages and 
communicative properties they express, as from their instrumental capacity to regulate 
behaviour. 
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 1 
Introduction 
Anti-social behaviour has become a major policy preoccupation in recent years and 
has provided the fertile terrain out of which considerable legal and regulatory 
innovations have grown. Anti-social behaviour has come to comprise and delineate a 
distinctive, if capacious and ill-defined, field that blurs and transcends traditional 
differentiations between crime and disorder. In the process, it has refigured and 
(con)fused civil and criminal legal processes and principles, as well as muddied the 
relation between formal and informal regulatory responses. In practice, interventions 
for tackling anti-social behaviour comprise a policy domain in which diverse 
organisational interests, working assumptions, priorities and multi-disciplinary 
approaches coalesce, often in awkward combinations. Despite their apparent generic 
implications, the new laws, technologies and strategies brought into being by anti-
social behaviour legislation, are concerned, above all else, with the question of 
governing „troublesome youth‟.1  
The extensive array of new powers, inter alia, acceptable behaviour contracts 
(ABCs), anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs), parenting orders, parenting contracts, 
tenancy demotion orders, anti-social behaviour housing injunctions (ASBIs), „crack-
house‟ closure orders, designated public places orders (DPPOs), dispersal orders and 
penalty notices for disorder (PND), as well as the latest proposals for premise closure 
orders and „deferred‟ PNDs.2 As this list testifies, the hyper-active reform agenda has 
seen the creation of new institutional tools and legal powers and their equally frenetic 
extension and replacement by alternatives and supplements. Such has been the pace of 
change that it has allowed little time or space for consideration of the impact of new 
technologies and prohibitions or for informed analysis. To date, much of the critical 
commentary has focused on the ASBO and has largely been „directed at the rhetoric 
rather than on evidence of what the impacts of the new policies have actually been‟.3 
This has been exacerbated by the fact that government has explicitly preferred not to 
fund significant or detailed evaluations, but instead has restricted oversight to the 
                                                 
1
 See E. Burney, Making People Behave: Anti-social behaviour, politics and policy (Cullompton: 
Willan, 2005); P. Squires and D. E. Stephen, Rougher Justice: Anti-social behaviour and young people 
(Cullompton: Willan, 2005); and A. Crawford, Governing the Future: The Contractual Governance of 
Anti-Social Behaviour (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). 
2
 As outlined in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill 2008. 
3
 D. Smith, „New Labour and Youth Justice‟ (2003) 17 Children & Society 226, 233. 
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collection of limited data on the use of powers via annual surveys and the crude 
monitoring of public perceptions. This willful neglect of evaluation and close 
monitoring of the impact of the anti-social behaviour agenda was roundly condemned 
by the House of Common‟s Committee of Public Accounts.4  
The available research has largely highlighted the significant use of ASBOs 
with juveniles (over 40 per cent), their high breach rate, the growing use of ASBOs 
attached to a criminal conviction (more than 60 per cent) and the variable use of 
different powers across the country, largely due to local preferences for particular 
approaches rather than reflecting differences in types of behaviour.
5
 This „justice by 
geography‟ underscores both the discretionary nature of the powers and the subjective 
interpretation they invest in local enforcement officers.  
Both collectively and individually, many of the new modes of control 
represent a shifting orientation towards forms of governance and behavioural 
regulation that focus less on knowing and accounting for past incidences than 
disrupting, reordering and steering possible futures. They seek to regulate crime and 
disorder through their consequences for, and interconnections with, wider social 
problems. Simultaneously, they reflect an individualisation of control, in which 
responses are tailored around personal and contextual characteristics. In the process of 
„rebalancing justice‟, as deemed necessary by the current government to „ensure 21st 
century laws for 21
st
 century crimes‟,6 there has been a subtle shift from due process 
requirements as defining ideals of justice to security and public perceptions as 
predominant overarching narratives. In this article, it is not my intention to review the 
full panoply of new powers but to focus on one particularly controversial, but little 
discussed, legal innovation, namely dispersal powers introduced by section 30 of the 
Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003. The powers are inherently contentious, given the 
                                                 
4
 In the absence of evaluation it asserted that: „Decisions are based on local preferences and the 
familiarity of those in authority with the different types of measures, rather than an objective 
assessment of what works with different types of perpetrators‟; see House of Commons Committee of 
Public Accounts, Tackling Anti-Social Behaviour, Forty-fourth report of Session 2006-7, HC 246 
(London: Stationery Office, 2007) 5. 
5
 National Audit Office, The Home Office: Tackling Anti-Social Behaviour, (London: NAO, 2006); and 
A.-R. Solanki, T. Bateman, G. Boswell and E. Hill, Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (London: Youth 
Justice Board, 2006). 
6
 Home Office, Rebalancing the criminal justice system in favour of the law-abiding majority: Cutting 
crime, reducing reoffending and protecting the public (London: Home Office, 2006) 11. 
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wide scope of discretion they accord to police and the infringements on the rights of 
individuals to free movement and assembly that they entail. My intention here is to 
use the dispersal order as a vantage point from which to assess some of the wider 
implications of anti-social behaviour legislation.  
 This article draws on the first major empirical study of the use and impact of 
dispersal powers.
7
 Conducted over a 12 month period from April 2006 to March 
2007, the research gathered data from three main sources. The first entailed a national 
overview of practice drawn from interviews conducted with practitioners from 13 
police force areas across the UK, as well as national policy-makers. The second 
concerned two city-based studies in Sheffield and Leeds, and explored the 
development of strategies over time, the distribution of orders across a city and 
longer-term impacts. In support of this, interviews were conducted with police, local 
authority staff and others involved in the implementation of dispersal orders since 
their introduction. The third source focused on two case study sites in North 
Yorkshire and Outer London. In each a six-month dispersal order was investigated 
from instigation to completion. Surveys and focus groups were conducted with adult 
residents and pupils attending a local school, and interviews took place with key 
stakeholders and police. Police enforcement practices were observed.
8
 
It will be argued that the significance of dispersal orders derives in large part 
from the symbolic messages and communicative properties they express, as much as 
from their instrumental capacity to regulate behaviour. This, it is suggested, is a 
defining attribute of much recent anti-social behaviour legislation, whereby conveying 
the message that certain misconduct is being taken seriously by relevant legal 
authorities and that something is being done in response, is more salient than the 
appropriateness or effectiveness of the course of action taken. It reflects a 
preoccupation in which the ambitions of governing and state-craft have narrowed to a 
focus on individual behaviour as the crucible in which the fortunes of government are 
forged. In the face of uncontrollable flows of capital, goods, people and risks, 
governments (both local and national) have re-sighted their energies on the 
management of public displays of behaviour. Being seen to be doing something 
                                                 
7
 A. Crawford and S. Lister, The Use and Impact of Dispersal Orders: Sticking Plasters and Wake-Up 
Calls (Bristol: Policy Press, 2007).  
8
 The research study was funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation in the absence of any Home 
Office sponsored evaluations. For further information on the research methods see ibid, 8. 
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tangible in response to local demands and to assuage public perceptions via the micro-
management of uncivil behaviour has become an increasingly prominent 
governmental raison d’être. 
The research evidence, however, suggests the messages that dispersal orders 
impart to different audiences are both mixed and often counterproductive, 
simultaneously raising expectations about policing priorities and reinforcing dominant 
adult assumptions about young people. The research reveals a significant disjuncture 
between the potential scope of the law and the more circumscribed manner in which it 
has generally been interpreted by the police. However, this dissonance is itself a 
major source of confusion. Where implemented, dispersal orders have the capacity to 
undermine police-community relations and leave young people feeling resentful and 
unfairly stigmatised. The paper concludes with some reflections on the broader 
trajectory of legislative developments and their implications. 
 
The origins of the dispersal order 
Part 4 of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 (sections 30-36) gives the police in 
England and Wales new powers to disperse groups of two or more people from 
designated areas where there is believed to be significant and persistent anti-social 
behaviour and a problem with groups causing intimidation. Analogous (although 
slightly less extensive) powers are available in Scotland under the AntiSocial 
Behaviour etc. (Scotland) Act 2004. The powers are exceptional in that they are both 
time-limited and geographically-bounded to specific areas that have been authorised 
for their use. Unsurprisingly, given the restrictions on civil liberties that such powers 
entail, their introduction has been intensely controversial.
9
  
The idea of dispersal orders was first articulated in the white paper Respect 
and Responsibility, which expressed „the need for a cultural shift from a society where 
too many people are living with the consequences of anti-social behaviour, to a 
society where we respect each other, our property and our shared public spaces‟.10 
The genesis of dispersal orders owes much to a combination of at least five factors. 
First, there was a distinct frustration on the part of government ministers over the 
                                                 
9
 C. Walsh, „Dispersal of Rights: A Critical Comment on Specified Provisions of the Anti-Social 
Behaviour Bill‟ (2003) 3 Youth Justice 104. 
10
 Home Office, Respect and Responsibility – Taking a Stand Against Anti-Social Behaviour, Cm 5778 
(London: Home Office, 2003) 6.  
 5 
perceived failure of local authorities and the police to use the curfew powers given to 
them under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and extended under the Criminal 
Justice and Police Act 2001.
11
 The original power in the 1998 Act allowed for local 
authorities to apply for local curfew orders for children under 10 in specified areas 
(section 14). Subsequently, not one local authority across England and Wales sought 
to use this power. According to Jack Straw this was due to an inherent „conservatism‟ 
among local authorities.
12
 To avoid this, the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 
extended the power to apply for a curfew order to local chief police officers (section 
49) – clearly deemed to be less „conservative‟ – and increased the age range to 
include under 16 year olds (section 48). Despite these extensions, the power remained 
(and remains) unused. 
Secondly, there was a growing belief that the police were unable to respond 
adequately to low level but persistent group-related anti-social activity and 
intimidatory behaviour. Lack of witness statements was often cited as a stumbling 
block to prosecutions. So too, a growing culture of rights and a loss of deference to 
authority were perceived as undermining policing.
13
 In England and Wales, the police 
themselves lobbied for new powers to redress the perceived imbalance.
14
 
Thirdly, evidence from the British Crime Survey seemed to show an increase 
in public perceptions of anti-social behaviour as a problem.
15
 Most specifically, the 
percentage of people who identified youths hanging about in the street in their locality 
                                                 
11
 C. Walsh, „Curfews: No More Hanging Around‟ (2002) 2 Youth Justice 70. 
12
 House of Commons, The Criminal Justice and Police Bill: Bill 31 of 2000-2001, Research Paper 
(London: House of Commons, 2001) 40. 
13
 If the problem was one of front-line police officers with insufficient power and authority, it is 
something of an incongruity that a new breed of police personnel with reduced powers, limited training 
and significantly less authority – namely the police community support officer – was introduced at the 
same time (via the Police Reform Act 2002) to deliver the anti-social behaviour agenda. See A. 
Crawford, S. Lister, S. Blackburn and J. Burnett, Plural Policing (Bristol: Policy Press, 2005). 
14
 Interestingly, however, north of the border, senior and rank-and-file police organisations (the 
Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland and the Scottish Police Federation) both opposed the 
introduction of dispersal orders: see J. Flint, R. Atkinson and S. Scott, A Report on the Consultation 
Responses to Putting Our Communities First: A Strategy for Tackling Anti-social Behaviour 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Executive, 2003). 
15
 M. Wood, Perceptions and Experiences of Anti-Social Behaviour: Findings from the British Crime 
Survey 2003/04 (London: Home Office, 2004). 
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as „a big problem‟ was not only significant but growing. In the decade between 1992 
and 2002 the figure increased by nearly two-thirds from 20 per cent to 33 per cent. 
This increase in public anxieties appeared to fly in the face of evidence from both 
police recorded statistics and the British Crime Survey that aggregate crime rates were 
falling after reaching a high-point in the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, public perceptions, 
as determined by survey findings, remained stubbornly of the view that crime and 
anti-social behaviour were inexorably on the rise.
16
 This „reassurance paradox‟ 
increasingly came to dominate political preoccupations and policy debate, notably 
with regard to policing and police reform.
17
  
Fourthly, there was a growing acknowledgement of the particular impact on 
public perceptions of safety of repetitive incivilities and cumulative disorders that 
belie their seriousness as defined in criminal legal terms. Moreover, it was argued that 
doing something to combat these „signs of crime‟ may produce real benefits for crime 
reduction, local community well-being and perceptions of personal safety, reflecting 
the growing influence of Wilson and Kelling‟s „broken window‟ thesis on public 
policy.
18
 Incivilities and disorder, they argued, were precursors to, and harbingers of, 
crime: if left unchecked, anti-social behaviour generates, in a chain of causation, more 
serious crime and community breakdown. A search of official policy documents 
across government departments, revealed some 48 publications between 2000 and 
2006 that had either an implicit or explicit reference to Wilson and Kelling‟s ideas.19  
Finally, this combined with a shift in government focus (especially during the 
second Blair administration) towards ensuring the delivery of programmes and policy 
initiatives, notably regarding public sector reform and the implementation of new 
powers. This was reflected in the establishment of the Delivery Unit at the heart of 
central government in 2001. A key philosophy behind the shift was that „numbers are 
                                                 
16
 Regular sweeps of the British Crime Survey showed that approximately two-thirds of the population 
continued to believe crime to be increasing across the country in the preceding two years. 
17
 A. Crawford, „Reassurance Policing: Feeling is Believing‟, in A. Henry and D. J. Smith (eds), 
Transformations of Policing (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).  
18
 J. Q. Wilson and G. Kelling, „Broken Windows: The Police and Neighbourhood Safety‟ (1982) The 
Atlantic Monthly, March, 29. 
19
 M. Innes and V. Jones, Neighbourhood Security and Urban Change (York: Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, 2006). 
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important but not enough: citizens have to see and feel the difference‟.20 Hence 
delivering irreversible change that citizens might notice and appreciate became a 
major policy driver.
21
 Towards the end of his period in office, Tony Blair reflected 
upon the importance of public perceptions: 
the other thing I have learnt in over 8 years of being Prime Minister is that you 
can argue about statistics until the cows come home and there is usually a very 
great credibility gap between whatever statistics are put out and whatever 
people actually think is happening, but the real point is not about statistics, it is 
about how people feel… because the fear of crime is as important in some 
respects as crime itself.
22
 
 
Anti-social behaviour 
The legal definition of anti-social behaviour as that which „causes or is likely to cause 
harassment, alarm or distress‟ to others,23 introduces public perceptions as central 
criteria. Consequently, the resultant interpretation is both subjective and context 
specific. As such, it has been the subject of extensive debate.
24
 Its meaning is 
dependent upon local norms and values as well as individual sensibilities. It is 
officially recognised that people‟s understanding of what constitutes anti-social 
behaviour is „determined by a series of factors including context, location, community 
tolerance and quality of life expectations… what may be considered anti-social 
behaviour to one person can be seen as acceptable behaviour to another‟.25 For this 
reason, the policy and legal definition has been left deliberately opaque. The Home 
Office has steadfastly resisted closer categorisation, arguing rather that it correctly 
should mean different things in different localities. This confounds difficulties of 
                                                 
20
 M. Barber, Instruction to Deliver (London: Politico‟s, 2007) 370. 
21
 See also D. Blunkett, The Blunkett Tapes: My Life in the Bear Pit (London: Bloomsbury, 2006). 
22
 Speech to a conference by Safer Croydon partnership 10th February 2006, emphasis added; available 
at: http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page9040.asp (accessed 19.12.2007) 
23
 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 1. 
24
 S. Macdonald, „A Suicidal Woman, Roaming Pigs and a Noisy Trampolinist: Refining the ASBO‟s 
Definition of Anti-Social Behaviour‟ (2006) 69 Modern Law Review 183; and A. Millie, J. Jacobson, 
E. McDonald and M. Hough, Anti-Social Behaviour Strategies: Finding a Balance (Bristol: Policy 
Press, 2005). 
25
 Home Office, Defining and Measuring Anti-Social Behaviour, Development and Practice Report 26, 
(London: Home Office, 2004) 3. 
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measurement and meaning, especially between diverse local agencies and across 
different areas. 
In policy discourse anti-social behaviour embodies both a common-sense 
understanding and appeals to popular sentiments. It operates at an affective level on 
the basis of feelings and emotion that provoke action. Importantly, however, this 
reminds us that perceptions of insecurity are influenced by both subjective and 
objective judgments; they are simultaneously symbolic and material. It also alludes to 
the communicative dimension of governmental strategies including legal powers and 
policing.
26
 In interview, David Blunkett, the Home Secretary who introduced the 
Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003, explained the genesis of the dispersal power as, in 
large part, stimulated by the desire to restore some faith in the capacity of the 
processes of democracy to work to deliver tangible change. For him, the power was 
designed to counter the perceptions that:  
the local authority won‟t do anything, the police won‟t do anything, the local 
school won‟t do anything, and the housing tenancy arrangements won‟t work. 
That was the cry we were responding to, that “nobody will ever listen to us”, 
that “they won‟t do anything, it doesn‟t matter how bad it is”… Not just in 
terms of [public] well-being, their health and their living conditions but also 
their belief that processes of democracy do work, that things can change.
27
 
From their inception, dispersal powers were associated with the anxieties generated 
by young people congregating in public places. Although the legislation is not 
targeted specifically at young people, the genesis and use of the powers reflect this 
preoccupation. 
 
The nature of the powers 
The exceptional nature of dispersal powers is underscored by the legislative 
requirement for prior authorisation. This necessitates that a senior police officer 
(Superintendent or above) has reasonable grounds for believing that members of the 
public have been intimidated, harassed, alarmed or distressed in a particular locality 
as a result of the presence or behaviour of groups of two or more people and that anti-
                                                 
26
 R. V. Ericson, K. D. Haggerty and K. D. Carriere, „Community Policing as Communications 
Policing‟, in D. Dölling, and T. Feltes (eds), Community Policing: Comparative Aspects of Community 
Oriented Police Work (Holzkirchen, Obb.: Felix, 1993).  
27
 Personal interview, 12 January 2007. 
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social behaviour is a significant and persistent problem in that area. In making the 
decision to authorise, evidence is to be obtained to support the application, collated 
from force incident logs as well as other evidential statements from local agencies 
(notably housing, social services or education) and complainants. The police must 
obtain the consent of the local authority to the authorisation as a check that the powers 
are appropriate and proportionate. Consequently, the process devolves key decision-
making powers to senior police and local authority managers and serves as a test of 
the robustness of partnership relations. 
The authorisation must be in writing, signed and specify the relevant locality, 
the grounds upon which it is given and the period during which the powers may be 
exercised (up to six months). The authorisation must be publicised either via a local 
newspaper and/or by notices in the area. At the end of the initial period, designation 
may be renewed. If it turns out that an order is no longer necessary or proportionate, 
the police can withdraw the authorisation at any stage pursuant to section 31(6) of the 
Act, with the agreement of the local authority.  
Within a designated zone a police constable or community support officer (CSO) 
may disperse groups of two or more where their presence or behaviour has resulted, 
or is likely to result, in a member of the public being harassed, intimidated, alarmed or 
distressed. The officer may give one or more of the following directions: 
i. require people in the group to disperse either immediately or at a stated time and 
in a stated way; 
ii. require any people whose place of residence is not within the relevant locality to 
leave the area or any part of it either immediately or by such time and/or in such a 
manner as specified; and  
iii. prohibit any people who do not reside in the designated area from returning to the 
relevant locality for a period up to 24 hours.  
A person does not commit an offence because an officer has chosen to use the power 
to disperse, but if individuals refuse to follow the officer‟s directions, they will be 
committing an offence, punishable by up to 3 months imprisonment and/or a fine of up 
to £5,000. The Act provides additional powers for dealing with those aged under 16 
(section 30(6)). Where a police constable believes such a person to be in the 
authorised area between the hours of 9pm and 6am and without a parent or 
responsible adult, he or she may remove the child to their home address, unless the 
police officer has reasonable grounds for believing that the child, if removed to that 
 10 
place, would be likely to suffer significant harm.
28
 The local authority must be 
informed when this power is used. 
 
The Scottish approach 
In Scotland, unlike England and Wales, there was considerable public debate around 
the introduction of the powers. Over 80 per cent of responses to the consultation 
process opposed the introduction of dispersal orders, on the grounds that the police 
already had sufficient powers.
29
 The laws introduced in Scotland, some nine months 
after the English legislation, benefited from this time-lag and more extensive 
consultation process. Consequently, there are some important divergences of 
approach, summarised in Table 1. The most noteworthy are: the higher threshold for 
authorisation; the shorter duration of designation; the absence of the power to escort 
home young people under 16 after 9pm in a designated area; and the legal 
requirement to conduct a three year review of the operation of the power. These small 
but important dissimilarities reflect much broader cultural and legal differences of 
approach in Scotland, where there is greater reluctance to use criminalisation as a 
means of managing youth problems, as enshrined in the Kilbrandon philosophy and 
the Children‟s Hearing system.30 
Largely as a result of the public debate about the appropriateness of the new 
orders, senior police officers in Scotland were initially reluctant to use the powers. By 
April 2007, some 14 dispersal zones had been designated in Scotland covering 11 
locations. This compares dramatically to the much more extensive use south of the 
border. A total of 1,065 areas were designated in England and Wales up to April 2006 
according to the most recent Home Office figures.
31
 
 
                                                 
28
 Home Office, Part 4 Of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003, circular 004/2004 (London: Home 
Office, 2004). 
29
 Flint et al, n 14 above, 109. 
30
 Named after the Kilbrandon Committee report published in 1964, which has informed the principal 
values and institutions of youth justice ever since, stressing early and minimal intervention, avoiding 
stigmatisation through criminalisation, with an emphasis on the needs of children rather than their 
(mis)deeds. The system of children‟s hearing panels, introduced some years after the publication of the 
report encapsulates this philosophy. See Kilbrandon Committee, Report on Children and Young 
Persons, Scotland (Edinburgh: HMSO, 1964). 
31
 Home Office, Tools and Powers to Tackle Anti-Social Behaviour (London: Home Office, 2007) 8. 
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Table 1: Scotland and England & Wales compared 
 England & Wales Scotland 
Legislative basis Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 AntiSocial Behaviour etc. 
(Scotland) Act 2004 
Commencement date 20 January 2004 1 October 2004 
Threshold for 
authorisation 
Where anti-social behaviour is a 
significant and persistent 
problem.  
Where anti-social behaviour is a 
significant, persistent and serious 
problem. 
Duration of designation Up to six months (renewable) Up to three months (renewable) 
Involvement of local 
authority? 
Agreement of the local authority 
must be obtained. 
Local authority is to be consulted 
and full account taken of their 
views, but ultimate decision lies 
with the senior police officer.  
Who can use the powers? Powers extend to police 
Community Support Officers  
Limited to police constable. No 
equivalent to Community Support 
Officers in Scotland. 
Extent of powers Escort power to remove home a 
young person under 16 who is out 
on the streets between 9pm and 
6am, not under adult control  
No equivalent power 
Penalties available for 
breach 
A fine of up to £5,000 and/or 
imprisonment of up to three 
months. 
A fine of up to £2,500 and/or 
imprisonment of up to three 
months. 
Evaluation requirement No equivalent requirement to 
evaluate implementation or 
effectiveness. 
Requirement on Scottish 
Ministers to conduct a study into 
the operation of dispersal powers 
and lay it before Parliament 
within three years of the powers‟ 
commencement (Part 3, s. 24)  
Use By April 2006 over 1,000 areas 
authorised. 
By April 2006 only six areas 
authorised (increased to 14 by 
April 2007) 
 
 12 
These differences reflect wider disparities in approaches in the two jurisdictions 
concerning the regulation of youth and anti-social behaviour.
32
 Despite important 
recent legal convergence,
33
 Scottish practitioners have been more reluctant to enforce 
new anti-social behaviour powers granted to them.
34
 The Scottish approach has also 
been informed more significantly by research evidence. Whereas the Home Office 
explicitly preferred not to evaluate the impact of dispersal orders, the Scottish 
legislation required that a study to review their implementation be conducted within 
three years and the findings be put before the Scottish Parliament.
35
 In the light of this 
and other research evidence,
36
 in October 2007, the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP)-
led government announced a formal review of Scotland‟s anti-social behaviour 
legislation.
37
 
                                                 
32
 See L. McAra, „The cultural and institutional dynamics of transformation: youth justice in Scotland, 
England and Wales‟ (2004) 35 Cambrian Law Review 23; A. Cleland and K. Tisdall, „The challenge of 
antisocial behaviour: The new relationships between state, children and parents‟ (2005) 19 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 395; S. Macdonald and M. Telford, „The use of 
ASBOs against young people in England and Wales: Lessons from Scotland‟ (2007) 27 Legal Studies 
604. 
33
 L. McAra, „Modelling Penal Transformation‟ (2005) 7 Punishment & Society 277. 
34
 For example, despite their existence on the statute book, to date, there have been no parenting orders 
imposed in Scotland. Furthermore, by contrast to England and Wales where some 42 per cent of 
ASBOs given involved young people aged 10-17, in Scotland only 13 per cent of ASBOs granted in 
2005/06 were in relation to youths aged 18 or under. By 2007, whereas 96 individuals had been 
considered for an ASBO in Scotland, only four had been granted. For England and Wales see Home 
Office website http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/asbos/asbos2.htm and for Scotland see 
DTZ Consulting and Heriot-Watt University, Use of Antisocial Behaviour Orders in Scotland 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Government Social Research, 2007). 
35
 B. Cavanagh, A Review of Dispersal Powers (Edinburgh: Scottish Government Social Research, 
2007). 
36
 J. Flint et al., An evaluation of the implementation and impact of local antisocial behaviour 
strategies at the neighbourhood level (Edinburgh: Scottish Government Social Research, 2007). 
37
 Scottish Government, Tackling Anti-Social Behaviour, Press release 25 October (Edinburgh: Scottish 
Government, 2007) http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2007/10/25101807 (accessed 
19.12.2007) 
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The authorisation process 
There has been considerable local variation in the take-up and use of dispersal 
powers.
38
 This is not linked directly to differences in the extent or type of behaviour 
leading to designation, but appears more significantly to be due to local preferences 
for particular approaches to enforcement, the willingness of key individuals to 
experiment with new legal powers and the capacity of local interests to organise and 
champion a police-led response. The research highlights that the rigors attached to the 
authorisation process have been variously interpreted.
39
 In some instances, 
considerable emphasis was given to the information-base upon which an application 
was founded. In others, however, the process was accorded less significance and on 
occasions was viewed less robustly, as „boxes to be ticked‟ rather than an essential 
bedrock upon which the efficacy and legitimacy of designation is based. The research 
also uncovered examples where police data were insufficient to justify a dispersal 
order and alternative sources of information, sometimes reflecting subjective opinions 
and the views of prominent community members, were used to supplement the 
evidence-base. 
In contrast to Scotland where the bar is set higher, in England and Wales there 
is no legal requirement that the history of anti-social behaviour is „serious‟, as well as 
„significant and persistent‟. The Scottish guidance defines the „seriousness‟ test as 
follows: 
Antisocial behaviour should be regarded as serious if there is a possible danger 
or risk to members of the public, arising from the antisocial behaviour in a 
relevant locality. On this basis, minor antisocial behaviour that mainly causes 
irritation might not be deemed to be of sufficient gravity to be considered 
„serious‟.40 
Such a test might go some way to ensure that dispersal order use is a genuinely 
proportionate response to local problems. The considerably smaller number of 
dispersal authorisations in Scotland might suggest that this test is a significant factor 
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in limiting the use of the powers. The implications for England and Wales may be that 
raising the evidence threshold might reduce the dangers of dispersal authorisation 
being exploited as a means of drawing additional police resources into areas where 
public perceptions and intergenerational anxieties, rather than crime and disorder per 
se, are the root of the problem.  
This is particularly pertinent as research in both Scotland and England 
highlights that the geographic and social map of dispersal order use does not 
correspond straightforwardly to the distribution of risks or victimisation. Data show 
that across the cities of Leeds and London, for example, the areas designated for 
dispersal powers were not necessarily those with the highest concentration of 
recorded anti-social behaviour. Despite the higher threshold in Scotland, the research 
evidence reveals that none of the initial 14 dispersal authorisations were in areas 
ranked as in the most deprived 5 per cent in Scotland (according to the Scottish 
Indices of Multiple Deprivation, 2006).
41
 By contrast, one authorisation (in the village 
of Mid-Calder) was ranked in the 10 per cent of the least deprived areas in Scotland. 
Given the correlation between deprivation and levels of crime and anti-social 
behaviour, this suggests an uneasy relationship between objective risks of 
victimisation and subjective perceptions of public anxieties. It also implies that the 
„seriousness‟ test in Scotland may not be sufficiently robust in practice to avoid 
policing resources being skewed via dispersal authorisation into areas of high fear and 
perceptions of insecurity and, subsequently, away from areas of high crime need.
42
 
 
Interpretation by the courts 
The courts have been tentative and somewhat ambivalent in supporting the robustness 
of the authorisation process. Recognition of its importance in legitimising the 
extensive powers available to the police in a designated dispersal zone was reinforced 
by the court in the early case of Sierny v DPP.
43
 Here it was held that failure to 
provide any explanation of the grounds upon which an authorisation is based would 
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render the authorisation invalid and undermine the subsequent use of the powers. 
Nevertheless, whilst it was held that the reasons for authorisation needed to be clearly 
stated, the court found that there was no allied requirement to identify the evidence-
base upon which authorisation is premised.  
In Sierny, Justice Nelson appeared to go somewhat further in highlighting the 
pivotal role of the authorisation process as a safeguard mechanism. He suggested that 
the grounds specified in the authorisation would inform the police of the conditions or 
situations in which directions to disperse might occur:  
The section is designed to ensure that there is a proper thought-out basis for 
making the authorisation and expressing that basis in written form, which can 
later be examined and challenged, and which explains to the police, who may 
later be required to give dispersal directions, information as to the nature of the 
problem which gave rise to the authorisation and hence in what circumstances 
the need for directions may arise.
44
 
However, subsequently, in R (on the application of Singh) v Chief Constable of West 
Midlands Police,
45
 the Court of Appeal held that an authorisation granted on one set 
of specific grounds does not restrain the subsequent use of powers in relation to other 
forms of anti-social behaviour. In this instance, the dispersal powers had been 
authorised for the stated purpose of addressing alcohol-related violent and anti-social 
behaviour during the pre-Christmas period in a central location in Birmingham. 
Nevertheless, the powers were subsequently used to disperse a group of Sikh 
protesters outside a theatre which was staging a play that they found offensive. The 
court held that so long as the use of the dispersal powers is proportionate, there does 
not need to be a direct relationship between the grounds for the initial authorisation 
and their subsequent use. The court did so largely on the justification that to constrain 
the use of powers to the types of behaviour for which they were authorised would be 
„unworkable‟ and „undesirable‟, and hence, contrary to the intentions of Parliament. 
In the words of Lord Justice Maurice (in the Divisional court) „it would be absurd if 
the police were to have to procure a separate authorisation to deal with each 
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successive manifestation or source of disorder‟.46 This line of reasoning was reiterated 
in the Court of Appeal, where it was emphasised, nevertheless, that authorisation 
constitutes a major element in safeguarding civil liberties on the basis of the 
requirements for obtaining the consent of the local authority, the duty to give reasons 
and the duty to publicise. 
These judgments leave considerable discretion in the hands of the police and 
local authorities as to the robustness of the evidence-base and threshold for 
authorisation, as well as the remit for the subsequent use of the powers once 
authorisation has been granted. They reinforce the view expressed by some 
practitioners in the research that authorisation is simply a hurdle to be overcome – or 
„boxes to be ticked‟ – but once achieved and clearly publicised authorisation had little 
relationship to, or enduring influence over, subsequent implementation. This seems at 
odds with the approach advocated by more enlightened police and local authority 
practitioners who believed that the grounds for continued authorisation should be 
reviewed periodically (weekly or biweekly) and that the use of the powers should be 
restricted to the types of behaviour to which the dispersal order authorisation gave 
rise.
47
 
 
Evidence from research 
The uneven distribution of dispersal zones raises concerns regarding the extent to 
which certain communities (or vocal segments within them) and businesses are able to 
use their capacity to articulate concerns about anti-social behaviour and lobby local 
councillors and police to influence dispersal order authorisation. As visible policing is 
a limited public resource subject to significant competing public demands, dispersal 
orders can be seen as a way of attracting or capturing, at least for a short time, an 
increased level of police patrols. Local residents‟ groups and politicians were well 
aware of exploiting this opportunity. The implementation of „community call for 
action‟ procedures, as required under the Police and Justice Act 2006, will 
institutionalise a further channel for local people to register complaints regarding 
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perceived council and partnership inaction over anti-social behaviour, potentially 
fuelling demands for dispersal authorisations.
48
 
The existence of a dispersal order in one area often prompted calls for 
authorisation in neighbouring or nearby localities, provoked by concerns about 
displacement and/or perceptions that local policing cover was being drawn away from 
„their‟ area to police the nearby dispersal zone.49 Displacement was a genuine concern 
and to some degree a palpable product of dispersal. In many localities, dispersal 
orders generated short-term displacement effects, shifting problems to other places, 
sometimes merely for the duration of the order. An area neighbouring the North 
Yorkshire case study site saw crime, notably criminal damage, increase by 83 per cent 
during the six months of the order, as compared with the same period in the previous 
year. Furthermore, in the six months after the order, crime and anti-social behaviour 
returned to their pre-dispersal order levels, suggesting that the effect of the order did 
not endure beyond the authorisation period. In some instances, displacement was so 
localised that it was difficult to detect.  
Where concerns over displacement were articulated in pre-authorisation 
consultations, they sometimes generated pressure to increase the area covered by a 
dispersal zone, so as to address the concerns of neighbouring localities by 
incorporating them within the area to be designated. This was evident in dispersal 
designations in both residential areas and city centre locations. For example, in Leeds 
city centre an initial application to address a problem of young people gathering 
around a particular shopping arcade was expanded considerably, in response to 
consultation, to incorporate much of the city centre.
50
 Similarly, previous experiences 
of, and concerns over, displacement across force boundaries led Camden and 
Westminster police to authorise a „joint order‟ in a central London location during the 
summer of 2006. Perversely, this expansionist logic, whilst understandable as a 
response to fears about displacement effects, flies in the face of developing good 
practice which emphasises the targeted and tailored use of dispersal orders for specific 
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problems. In residential areas, in particular, a countervailing preoccupation that 
served to encourage the designation of smaller areas arose out of difficulties 
confronted by police in effecting directions to disperse where those concerned lived 
within, or were required to use, the designated zone (for example to attend school or 
work). As such, they could not be excluded from it. 
 
The escort power 
The discretionary power to return home young people under 16 who are out on the 
streets in a dispersal zone and not under the control of an adult after 9 pm was one of 
the most controversial elements of the legislation. Variously known as the „curfew‟, 
„removal‟ or „escort power‟, it was the subject of an early legal challenge in July 2005 
in the case of R (On the Application of W) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 
and Richmond Borough Council.
51
 Initially, the High Court ruled that the power to 
„remove‟ did not allow for the use of reasonable force, on the basis that Parliament 
could not have intended the power to be coercive, but rather permissive. Whilst the 
ruling did not invalidate the power itself, in the light of the judgment police forces 
around the country immediately suspended it, pending appeal, on the assumption that 
without the capacity to use reasonable force the power was redundant.  
However, in May 2006 the Court of Appeal over-turned this decision, holding 
that the word „remove‟ in the legislation does give rise to a coercive power and allows 
the police to „take away using reasonable force if necessary‟.52 It was held that the 
discretionary power could only be used if, in the light of its purpose, it was reasonable 
to do so. The court held that the legislation fulfils two purposes; to prevent children 
from themselves participating in anti-social behaviour and to protect them from anti-
social behaviour of others within a dispersal area. Hence the exercise of reasonable 
force in removing a young person to their home is conditional upon them either, first, 
being at risk of, or vulnerable to, becoming the victim of anti-social behaviour and 
crime or, secondly, causing (or at risk of causing) anti-social behaviour. It was 
affirmed that the Act did not confer an arbitrary power to remove children who were 
neither involved in, nor at risk of exposure to, actual or imminently anticipated anti-
social behaviour. To act reasonably, according to Lord Justice May, police „must have 
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regard to circumstances such as how young the child is; how late at night it is; 
whether the child is vulnerable or in distress; the child‟s explanation for his or her 
conduct and presence in the area; and the nature of the actual or imminently 
anticipated anti-social behaviour‟.53 In these circumstances, according to the Court of 
Appeal, the relevant section did carry with it a coercive power. However, the court 
did not consider issues relating to infringement of young people‟s rights, notably 
under the European Convention on Human Rights, because in this particular case the 
young person had not actually been escorted home and therefore no rights had 
actually been infringed. 
The judgment exposes a much wider ambiguity in the way in which children 
and young people are regarded in public policy. They are simultaneously constructed 
as potentially at risk and a potential risk. At one moment, they are in need of 
protection, only for the next instance to be construed as the source of social ills from 
which society needs protection. It is the latter construction of youth that predominates 
in, and informs, the implementation of dispersal orders. Whilst the Court of Appeal 
tried to restore some balance by conceiving of escort powers as, in large part, 
premised upon a discourse of child protection, this sits awkwardly with the tone and 
wider impact of dispersal orders which are implicitly and explicitly targeted at groups 
of young people as a social problem. The view that „escort powers‟ were genuinely 
motivated by concerns over child protection is undermined further by the fact that 
police already had available to them more extensive powers to take young people into 
police protection, regardless of whether they are in a dispersal zone or not, where the 
police believe the young person to be likely to suffer significant harm, under the 
Children Act 1989 (section 46). It is noteworthy that the legislation in Scotland does 
not include an equivalent escort power to that under the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 
2003, in large part because it was deemed to be unnecessarily coercive and in conflict 
with wider child-welfare policies.  
In the light of the Court of Appeal ruling in R(W), new guidance
54
 was 
published in England and Wales. The then Home Office Minister, Tony McNulty, 
challenged police and practitioners „to take a more robust and unremitting approach to 
tackling anti-social behaviour by making maximum use of the dispersal powers 
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available to them‟.55 Despite this, the power remains little used. Research shows that 
many police forces prefer not to use the power, either as a matter of general policy or 
within specific applications for dispersal orders. Data from across London for the year 
2006/07 show the escort powers were recorded as having been used in just two 
designated areas (out of 48) and only on four occasions.
56
 Some police officers felt 
that the powers were unnecessary, counterproductive or obscured the main aims of 
dispersal orders given their association with „curfews‟.  
 
The use of powers to disperse 
Most front-line police, notably community support officers, welcomed the additional 
flexibility that dispersal powers conferred upon them, particularly at a time when 
many felt their scope for discretion was being curtailed in other areas of police-work. 
The powers provided them with formal authority to do what many considered to be a 
key aspect of traditional policing, namely engaging with groups of young people and 
other „usual suspects‟, negotiating order and moving them on where deemed 
necessary for the purposes of social control.
57
 There are clear parallels between the 
use of dispersal orders and other discretionary police powers, such as stop and 
search.
58
 Some police managers indicated that the existence of dispersal powers 
actively encourages officers to engage young people in a dialogue about appropriate 
behaviour. Implementation strategies generally gave preference to dialogue and 
negotiation. In practice, recourse to formal powers was used sparingly. Police were 
often aware of the challenges of interpretation that the powers vest in them and 
subsequently preferred to err on the side of caution and not to rely on the formal 
authority the powers confer. Policing tended to occur in the shadow of the powers, 
rather than through their enforcement. Police frequently described the powers as a 
tool they kept in their „back pocket‟. This was reflected in the relatively low recorded 
use of formal powers. Across 42 dispersal zones in London that ended between 1 
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April 2006 and 31 March 2007, some 4,888 dispersal directions were given to 
individuals, an average of 116 per dispersal zone.
59
 However, only three orders 
accounted for more than half (54 per cent) of all people dispersed. Two of these 
orders were a renewal in the same residential area, which alone accounted for 1,853 
dispersals (38 per cent of the total), with the other covering a large commercial area in 
the West End. Consequently, fewer than 10 people on average each month were 
formally dispersed across the remaining 39 dispersal zones. This limited recourse to 
the formal powers was also replicated in the case study sites. In the Outer London 
case study site, for example, throughout the six month designation, 105 dispersal 
warnings were given, only one youth was escorted home and no arrests were made for 
anyone breaching a direction to disperse or returning to the area during their period of 
exclusion.
60
  
In practice, police have generally interpreted and implemented the legislation in 
a more circumscribed manner than the law might allow, often explicitly emphasising 
that the powers did not stop people from congregating in public places. Despite these 
assurances, the research highlighted that much public confusion persisted about what 
might trigger a direction to disperse. Interpretation of the law also presented 
considerable challenges to police officers asked to make on-the-spot decisions. In 
Singh v DPP, Lord Justice Hallett in the Court of Appeal gave little by way of 
guidance but suggested that:  
Police officers must act proportionately and sensibly.... They cannot act on a 
whim. Both authorisations and dispersal directions must be properly justified on 
an objective basis.
61
  
What this objective basis might be, given the legislation‟s  reference to the „likely‟ 
impact on (subjective) public perception, did not detain the court. However, it did 
note that the anxious perceptions of some people may be inadequate, in and of 
themselves, to constitute grounds for dispersal: 
„alarm or distress‟ in some circumstances may not be sufficient to justify a 
dispersal direction. One or two particularly sensitive members of the public may 
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be alarmed or distressed by conduct that would not or should not offend 
others.
62
 
In the more recent case of Marc Bucknell v DPP
63
 the High Court considered 
the vexed question of whether presence per se is sufficient to trigger dispersal powers. 
The case involved two groups of (black and Asian) young people returning home 
from school through a designated dispersal zone. There was no evidence that the 
youths were behaving in an anti-social manner nor that any member of the public was 
harassed, intimidated, alarmed or distressed. Nevertheless, the police officer directed 
the appellant to leave the area and subsequently arrested him once the appellant had 
refused to comply with the officer‟s directions. The question for the court, therefore, 
was whether the constable was within his powers to direct the youths to disperse out 
of the area on the basis that their presence was „likely to result, in any members of the 
public being intimidated, harassed, alarmed or distressed‟. Lord Justice May, 
delivering the judgment of the court, held that:  
Although section 30(3) is, by its words, in some circumstances capable of 
operating by presence alone of two or more persons, in my judgment great care 
is needed if that alone is relied on… In my view, unless there are exceptional 
circumstances not present in this case, a reasonable belief for the purpose of 
section 30(3) must normally depend, in part at least, on some behaviour of the 
group which indicates in some way or other harassment, intimidation, the cause 
of alarm or the cause of distress. If this were not so, there would, in my 
judgment, in a case such as this be an illegitimate intrusion into the rights of 
people to go where they please in public. In particular, as this case illustrates, it 
would intrude into the legitimate activities of young people going home from 
school by a reasonable route, behaving properly as they do so.
64
 
In contrast to some of the earlier cases, the court began to question the conditions 
under which dispersal powers might constitute an „illegitimate intrusion into the rights 
of people to go where they please in public‟. Lord Justice May affirmed the need for 
„a proportionate response within the terms of the legislation‟ as a pre-requisite for 
generating the necessary and reasonable belief of the likelihood of intimidation, 
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harassment, alarm or distress. However, he admitted to having „some sympathy with 
the Constable because he was put in the position of having to operate what, at the 
margins, is difficult legislation‟.65 This highlights a central problem in the law: the 
extensive potential application and scope of the powers demand that police officers 
engage in complex processes of interpretation that imply the self-limitation of 
discretion. It may be unreasonable to expect front-line police officers, including 
community support officers to whom the powers extend, to undertake such fine-
grained balancing of the legitimate activities of young people and intrusions into their 
rights to go where they please in public. As Lord Justice May noted, this places 
significant pressures of professional judgment on police in situations that may 
precipitate rather than reduce conflict.  
Furthermore, the discretionary and subjective nature of the powers leaves 
scope for inconsistent and differential enforcement in ways that can undermine 
perceptions of fairness and procedural justice. The research found that young people, 
in particular, were aware of different approaches to enforcement on the part of 
different police officers which, for them, merely served to highlight the 
discriminatory and inequitable implications of the powers more generally. The 
dangers of inconsistent implementation are most acute where police are drafted into 
an area to bolster visible patrols, because they may lack local knowledge. Young 
people often distinguished the local officers they knew from outsiders brought in to 
police the area during the dispersal order period. Changes of shift also had the 
potential to result in inconsistent application, notably where informal conditions of 
order had been negotiated between certain police officers and local youths only for 
these to be disregarded by a change in policing personnel.  
Whilst the research evidence that the police generally implemented the powers 
in a more circumscribed way than the law might allow is a welcome finding, the 
consequent disjuncture between the scope of the law and police practice served to fuel 
rather than quell public confusion. Police in both case study sites sought to make it 
clear that the dispersal order did not „ban groups from gathering‟, but nevertheless 
found it very difficult to answer specific questions about what behaviour or whose 
presence might trigger dispersal. The Home Office Guidance and Association of 
Chief Police Officers‟ Practice Advice were similarly unhelpful, largely preferring to 
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leave individual officers the responsibility to make informed decisions on the basis of 
the particular circumstances and prevailing conditions.
66
 The advice from the 
Association of Chief Police Officers underscored the context-specific nature of 
decision-making, asserting that the power „enables police officers and PCSOs to 
exercise discretion in respect of any situation attended, thereby enabling the situation 
to be dealt with on an individual and specific basis‟.67 Except for the rather vague 
comments by Lord Justice May, discussed above, the courts have been no more 
forthcoming with guidance.
68
 To some considerable degree, the nature of the powers 
renders guidance impractical. In keeping with other anti-social behaviour 
prohibitions, dispersal orders rest upon an assumption that executive officers, in this 
instance front-line police personnel, can be trusted to employ wide-ranging and far-
reaching powers responsibly and reasonably. Yet this seems strangely at odds with the 
logic of the Human Rights Act 1998 which emphasises the importance of protecting 
individuals from the misuse of state power.
69
  
In the research sites the ambiguity between law and practice animated 
concerns of young people about the uncertain and unpredictable response police 
officers might have to their presence in a dispersal zone. Many young people felt 
dispersal powers provided too much scope for the police to base their judgments on 
stereotypes of inappropriate visible appearance, clothing, demeanour or ethnicity. As 
with stop and search powers, stereotypes frequently fill the void within „reasonable 
suspicion‟.70 Home Office research shows that items of clothing worn by youths – 
such as baseball caps and hooded jackets – can render an individual suspicious in the 
eyes of the police.
71
 The evidence on, and debate over, the extent to which police 
discretion is influenced by racial assumptions is extensive but lies beyond the scope 
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of this paper.
72
 However, what is clear is that not enough is known about the factors 
that influence decision-making in relation to discretionary anti-social behaviour 
related powers. The House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, National 
Audit Office, Youth Justice Board and Runneymede Trust in separate reports have all 
highlighted the poor quality of data collection and monitoring of the impact of anti-
social behaviour interventions on different social groups, notably in terms of ethnic 
origin.
73
 This „knowledge gap‟ is also evident with regard to dispersal powers. Given 
the discretionary nature of the powers and the scope for discrimination in their 
enforcement, this is a particularly troubling lacuna. The only data available, relate to 
the first year of use of dispersal powers across London where 20 per cent of those 
dispersed were recorded as of black ethnic origin (as compared with census data 
across London of 11 per cent).
74
 However, as Bowling and Phillips‟s close analysis of 
stop and search statistics shows, disproportionate use does not necessarily correlate 
unproblematically with evidence of discrimination.
75
 It does, though, give cause for 
concern and demand further exploration, as well as effective monitoring to safeguard 
against unwarranted discrimination.
76
 
The fact that the law allows dispersal where the presence of groups is deemed 
likely to result in a member of the public being „alarmed or distressed‟, not only 
serves in practice to undermine police assurances (like those offered in the research 
sites) that groups could continue to congregate in dispersal zones that and only anti-
social behaviour would be targeted, but also challenges the legal principle that the law 
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should be known or knowable in advance of its application. The wide-ranging nature 
of the grounds that might trigger dispersal affronts the „principle of maximum 
certainty‟ and the requirements of „predictability, and “fair warning”‟77 as it is not 
clear that the application of the law is knowable in advance. For people living near 
and using designated dispersal areas, this uncertainty constituted a particularly 
troubling aspect of the powers for both potential victims and offenders. Young people, 
in particular, were keen to know what the parameters of acceptable presence and/or 
behaviour might be, prompting requests for clarification from police and others. 
Responses to these calls to „know where we stand‟ with regards to the law and its 
enforcement, however, were either not forthcoming or couched in such vague terms as 
to be almost meaningless. Ramsay astutely notes how the lack of „fair warning‟ 
evident in much anti-social behaviour legislation may mean „it is ultimately 
impossible to be sure that you have acted cautiously enough in the face of the 
uncertainties involved and that the problem of insecurity is therefore created by the 
law rather than solved by it‟.78  
 
Communicative properties 
As already implied, a significant dimension of the anti-social behaviour programme 
(and the Respect agenda that succeeded it) has been associated with responding to the 
perceived deleterious cumulative impact of low-level incivilities and disorder.
79
 As 
Innes and colleagues have forcefully argued, particular acts and events have a 
disproportionate impact on how individuals and communities experience and 
construct their beliefs about crime, disorder and control.
80
 They offer „signal crime 
theory‟ as an attempt to fill the lack of a „coherent explanation of the public 
understanding of crime and disorder, and how such understandings are imbricated in 
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the wider symbolic construction of social space‟.81 What they refer to as „signal 
crimes‟ or „signal events‟ are incidents, crimes and physical or social disorders that 
are interpreted by individuals as warning signals. Exposure to these signals produces a 
reconfiguration of beliefs or actions in response to the increased risk to which people 
perceive themselves to be exposed. By contrast, „control signals‟ refer to the ways in 
which the actions performed by the police and other local authorities may be 
interpreted by individuals or communities in ways that inform their judgments about 
security. These are the communicative properties of acts of social control. 
Importantly, not all events are assumed to have the same „signal value‟. Innes and 
colleagues suggest that certain local problems – such as groups of youths 
congregating in public spaces, graffiti and vandalism – which coalesce around the 
poorly defined and deeply ideological concept of „anti-social behaviour‟, may 
produce particularly strong signals. However, they acknowledge that „signal 
disorders‟ do not have a universal quality or fixed essence; people do not interpret 
warning signals in the same way. Rather, they are contextually situated and influenced 
by situational and cultural effects. Responding to warning signals that matter locally 
by influencing perceptions with suitable „control signals‟, it is argued, may deliver 
significant public reassurance dividends. Recognition is accorded to the importance of 
public perceptions in shaping how neighbourhoods change. From this perspective, 
addressing public perceptions and the symbolic dimensions of (dis)order become 
pivotal in narrowing the earlier mentioned „reassurance paradox‟ that has vexed 
politicians and police managers. 
These ideas have fed into, and influenced, public policies, most notably the 
launch of the reassurance policing agenda in 2003 and the subsequent national roll-out 
of neighbourhood policing.
82
 The most enduring insight has been that attention should 
be paid by the police and other legal authorities to the „processes of symbolic 
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communication, impression management, and the ways in which communities 
interpret crime and policing on a routine basis‟.83 Through the allied anti-social 
behaviour agenda, public perceptions have become a policy concern in their own right 
and „impression management‟ has assumed a more central place in local strategies of 
control. 
In this light, dispersal orders can be read as a pre-eminent form of „control 
signal‟. They operate as much through the symbolic messages and communicative 
properties they impart, as through their instrumental capacity to regulate behaviour. 
They express values and meaning in their designation (and the publicity associated 
with it), through partnership activities allied to an order and by drawing in additional 
visible police patrols. Importantly, the designation of exceptional powers to a specific 
locality emits messages about a place, its social relations, dominant values of order 
and general well-being. It seeks to convey signals about the types of behaviour that 
will and will not be tolerated, as well as appropriate responses to local complaints. 
The assumption is that dispersal authorisation and enforcement communicate 
important symbolic messages that neutralise or counteract the signal disorders by 
providing reassurance and security enhancement. As with ASBO enforcement, media 
publicity and public communication are central elements in implementing dispersal 
orders and enlisting community involvement.
84
  
From the research, local councillors and some police viewed the authorisation 
of a dispersal order as sending a clear message to residents (and thus the local 
electorate) that they were „doing something‟ tangible in response to concerns over 
safety and perceptions of insecurity.
85
 It constituted a high profile response that was 
seen to speak directly to the often heard grievance that „nobody takes our complaints 
seriously‟. In this sense, dispersal orders can have a decidedly political appeal. Not 
only do they communicate a willingness of authorities to act decisively but also that 
problems have reached such a point as to require drastic and exceptional action. 
Perversely, perhaps, the very exceptional nature of the powers can prompt local 
agencies, residents and businesses to work collaboratively and seize the opportunity to 
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make a difference. Some residents felt that the dispersal order, by indicating that 
authorities were being responsive to their concerns, was able to galvanise the local 
community, providing it with an opportunity to demonstrate that residents too could 
make a difference to the quality of life in their neighbourhood. Dispersal orders could 
render sections of the community both more confident in local authorities (police and 
council) and in their own „collective efficacy‟ and capacity to intervene in support of 
collective values.
86
 
Police managers were well aware of the fact that authorising a dispersal order 
provided a means of countering persistent complaints by residents and businesses that 
the police were not visible or responsive enough in their area. Dispersal authorisation 
presents a very tangible, high-profile and well-publicised response to public demands 
for action. Moreover, the fact that authorisation is for a time-limited period means that 
while the resource implications for the police were substantial, they were only short-
term and therefore could be more easily managed. A Superintendent interviewed in 
the research noted: „The public are demanding some sort of police action, and a 
dispersal order gives my officers that ability to say: “Look, we‟ve done something for 
you.”‟87 However, the research evidence suggests that, rather than placating public 
demands, the implementation of dispersal orders can serve to raise false expectations 
about both short-term (during the period of dispersal authorisation) and longer-term 
police priorities.
88
 In that the legislation requires local publicity to accompany the 
commencement of dispersal authorisation, it draws attention to the area, potentially 
fostering heightened sensibilities to the question of local order. This was most 
evidently expressed in calls for dispersal order renewal, notably as the end of the 
dispersal designation period drew closer. Where an intensive police presence is able 
to disrupt patterns of people congregating in public spaces, dispersal powers can 
incite genuinely held concerns about what will happen once the powers cease. That 
over one quarter of all authorisations are renewals – 27 per cent according to Home 
Office data
89
 – testifies to the self-perpetuating nature of the orders. 
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Understandably, few local practitioners were keen to accord the same 
publicity to the termination of an order for fear of sending out an adverse message 
that might be interpreted as meaning a loosening of control and lessening of police 
concern for the area. As a consequence, many orders tended to „peter out‟, often 
leaving local residents unaware of any long-term strategies that might have been 
implemented to address the original source of the problems and uncertain as to future 
police and local authority priorities in their area. Dispersal order implementation 
exposes the fact that public expectations about appropriate police responses to low-
level incidents of disorder may be easily raised but are much more difficult to lower 
without engendering sentiments of dissatisfaction and disappointment. 
 
Policing young people 
Where implemented, dispersal designation conveyed stark negative messages to 
young people about their status and how they are perceived by adults. It implies, and 
is interpreted as implying, that young people are problematic. In this way, the use of 
dispersal powers exposes a significant tension within public policy between the 
inclusionary commitments outlined in Every Child Matters,
90
 to listen to and involve 
young people as active agents, on the one hand, and the punitive and exclusionary 
dynamics that infuse the anti-social behaviour agenda, on the other hand. 
Survey and interview data from 13 to 18 year-old school pupils in the case 
study sites revealed that the young people living near and using dispersal areas 
generally understood the need for, and supported, police interventions where 
genuinely anti-social behaviour occurred, not least because they were most likely to 
be its victims.
91
 In keeping with national survey data,
92
 young people reported higher 
levels of victimisation from anti-social behaviour than did adult residents.
93
 Young 
people were also acutely aware of both the risks associated with congregating in 
public spaces and the paradox that whilst they derived considerable feelings of safety 
from being in a group, they also experienced encountering large groups as potentially 
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threatening and acknowledged that in groups they might appear intimidating to others. 
Nevertheless, more than four-fifths said they felt safer when out at night in groups.
94
 
The research highlights the potential for dispersal orders to antagonise and 
alienate young people who frequently feel targeted by the powers and unfairly 
stigmatised for being in public places. Some 61 per cent of young people in the Outer 
London case study area and 43 per cent in the North Yorkshire area said that they 
believed the dispersal order to have been unfairly targeted at young people.
95
 In the 
North Yorkshire site, over half of all young people surveyed said that the dispersal 
order had had a negative impact on their feelings towards the police.
96
 Many objected 
most vehemently to the apparently indiscriminate nature of the dispersal powers. On 
the one hand, they felt that insufficient differentiation was made between those simply 
hanging around in groups and those who actually engaged in anti-social behaviour. 
On the other hand, they felt that not enough police attention was accorded to adult 
forms of anti-social behaviour.  
Whilst there was much uncertainty on behalf of many young people as to 
when they had been formally dispersed, many of those who said they had been 
dispersed reported feeling unfairly treated. Half disagreed that the police listened to 
what they had to say and two-fifths said that the experience left them less confident in 
the police.
97
 Some suggested that dispersal orders introduced an element of „cat and 
mouse‟ gaming, whereby flouting authority by invading and fleeing the dispersal zone 
without being caught became a routine pastime, provoking a more antagonistic 
relationship between them and the police. 
Young people complained that they did not have safe and suitable alternative 
venues to congregate.
98
 In the absence of such alternative meeting places, the irony 
for many young people was that dispersing them and making them split up was likely 
to render them more, rather than less, vulnerable. Girls, in particular, were concerned 
about being split up as a result of directions to disperse and how this might increase 
their vulnerability. More generally, the displacement of young people to locations 
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outside or neighbouring a dispersal zone often meant that they were forced to 
congregate in less safe locations. As dispersal zones tend to focus upon contested 
public spaces serving different constituencies – such as town centres, village greens, 
shopping arcades, transport hubs and public amenities – which are generally well 
served by pedestrian flow, natural surveillance and good quality street lighting, this 
often resulted in young people being pushed into poorly lit spaces beyond the 
peripheries of routine pedestrian movement and, hence, outside the surveillance of 
„capable guardians‟. If dispersal orders are in any real sense designed with the 
intention of protecting vulnerable young people, then the logic of implementation 
would appear to fly in the face of such a contention. 
For many young people, meeting peers in local public spaces constitutes a 
fundamental aspect of developing their own sense of identity. It provides space in 
which to forge an independent capacity to manage risk and danger. In the absence of 
suitable alternative venues, public spaces constitute key resources for young people. 
In the context of growing evidence to suggest that children and young people‟s use of 
public spaces has decreased significantly since the 1970s and against the background 
of contemporary concerns over the dangers to young people‟s health and well-being 
of sitting at home either in front of television sets or at internet-connected computer 
screens, it seems strange that when young people venture out in groups they are 
perceived as the source of danger to be curtailed.
99
 It is a supreme ambiguity that 
through the dispersal order, sociability is itself posed as a threat on the basis of the 
fear of either what might occur or the anxieties in others that might be generated. 
 
Preventive exclusion 
Dispersal powers have a preventive and pre-emptive logic. They are justified in terms 
of preventing people from feeling frightened and, hence, discouraged from using 
public spaces or forestalling an escalation of anti-social behaviour and crime.
100
 
Rather than focusing on rendering individuals accountable for past actions, they seek 
to govern future behaviour primarily on the basis of exclusion from specific places for 
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a certain (limited) period of time. They constitute a form of „preventive exclusion‟101 
that implies a „precautionary principle‟.102 Thus, the „likelihood‟ that future acts might 
cause „harassment, alarm or distress‟ and „preventing‟ the occurrence of certain 
behaviours become the touchstones for intervention. People are judged in terms of 
what they might do. Anticipating and forestalling potential harm constitute a form of 
temporal and conceptual „pre-crime‟ implied in quests for security.103 In governing 
the future, however, uncertainty prevails. Whilst the science of „prediction‟ has begun 
to enter the world of governing human affairs, including crime control,
104
 in reality 
the scientific knowledge-base for prevention and pre-emption remains too ambiguous 
to be reliable. In the face of uncertainty, decision-makers are encouraged to err on the 
side of precaution. In the absence of „rationalistic‟ science to inform risk calculations, 
subjective public perceptions become the basis for this predictive governance. The 
wide ranging restrictions attached to ASBOs are a further testimony to the 
precautionary principle in operation. However, the dispersal order takes this logic 
further still by implicitly clearing the streets of young people as a precaution that they 
might intimidate others. Zedner notes: „It is now our not knowing, our inability to 
know, or unwillingness to prove what we think we know that provides the reason to 
act before that unknown threat makes itself known‟.105 The perceived threats to local 
social order posed by young people constitute powerful „known unknowns‟ that 
inform contemporary adult sensibilities, precautionary thinking and pre-emptive 
technologies. 
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Spatial exclusion as a form of crime prevention seeks to forestall and foreclose 
anti-social behaviour by banning people from certain locations and public spaces. 
There is no necessary attempt to induce changes in behaviour by appeals to normative 
standards or inculcate moral values, merely a command to „keep out‟. Consequently, 
dispersal powers by-pass the agency of the individuals concerned. The precautionary 
logic of public protection and reassurance takes precedence over attempting to know 
or understand individuals or their motivations. However, once the individuals have 
been given a direction to leave a dispersal zone they are treated as wilful and rational 
actors who either comply with or flout the conditions set down. Their agency becomes 
crucial to their prospects of criminalisation. A key element of the dispersal order, 
therefore, lies in the manner in which future conduct is regulated through the 
discretionary conditions attached to the direction to disperse. The resultant complex 
mosaic of „geographies of exclusion‟106 created by dispersal orders and other anti-
social behaviour interventions
 
may substantially restrict the ability of individuals and 
groups to access publicly-available resources and services, with implications for their 
capacity to enjoy the full trappings of citizenship and free movement. 
 
Two-step prohibition 
The future orientation implicit in dispersal orders exposes the manner in which they, 
in common with other anti-social behaviour interventions, constitute a type of what 
Simester and von Hirsch have called „two-step prohibitions‟.107 Classically, as in the 
ASBO, two-step prohibitions comprise a civil order backed up by a criminal 
penalty.
108
 The innovation lies in the fact that unlike other civil orders, such as 
injunctions (breach of which is a civil offence),
 
breach of a „two-step‟ prohibition is a 
criminal offence. This gives the courts the possibility for both a more severe and a 
broader range of punishments from which to select. The possibility of criminal 
sanctions arises only in respect of future conduct, not in relation to the conduct that 
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gave rise to the order in the first place.
109
 The behaviour that breaches the conditions 
may under all other circumstances constitute legal behaviour. The conditions imposed 
at the first step create something tantamount to what the European Commissioner for 
Human Rights described as „personalised penal codes, where noncriminal behaviour 
becomes criminal for individuals who have incurred the wrath of the community‟.110  
For those dispersed, their subsequent presence in the designated dispersal zone 
becomes an offence. As Simester and von Hirsch note, such an order criminalises 
future conduct: „it is a form of criminalisation: an ex ante criminal prohibition, not an 
ex post criminal verdict‟.111  
In the „two-step‟ process, principles of proportionality are decoupled from 
directly structuring the relationship between past acts and future constraints. By 
fusing civil and criminal processes, hybrid prohibitions have fostered „new variations 
of liability‟ designed specifically to evade established safeguards that themselves have 
been redefined as troublesome obstacles to effective regulation.
112
 This reflects the 
manner in which much anti-social behaviour law conforms to what Ericson refers to 
as forms of „counter-law‟ whereby: „New laws are enacted and new uses of existing 
law are invented to erode or eliminate traditional principles, standards, and procedures 
of criminal law that get in the way of pre-empting imagined sources of harm‟.113  
In many „two-step‟ prohibitions the first step is based on a court order, with 
associated procedural safeguards. Dispersal orders, however, take the two-step logic 
further away from legal oversight by granting authority to front-line police officers, 
both to issue the directions and to enforce compliance. Whilst the ASBO appears to 
conflate the legislative, adjudicative and executive functions in the hands of 
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magistrates,
114
 dispersal powers perform a similar enterprise devolving analogous 
functions into the hands of the constable or community support officer, in situations 
where oversight and review are severely limited.  
As dispersal orders provide police with powers to enforce non-compliance 
with police directions, enforcement can easily become bound up with judgments 
about the manner in which (young) people respond to officers‟ decisions or question 
their authority.
115
 In such circumstances, perceptions of those dispersed regarding the 
legitimate authority of the officer will be shaped by the apparent fairness of the 
direction, the appropriate manner in which the police exercise their powers, explain 
their reasoning, listen to what those subject to the direction have to say and treat them 
with respect. In short, compliance will be strongly influenced by perceptions of 
procedural fairness. There is now a substantial body of research demonstrating that 
experiences of procedural justice can significantly affect perceptions of legitimacy 
and public confidence in the police as well as legal compliance.
116
 As this implies, 
perceptions of unfairness may not only have negative implications for compliance but 
also provoke active defiance. Given the sentiments of unfairness provoked among 
young people living in and using the dispersal zones, uncovered by the research, it is 
not hard to see how or why some young people might feel less inclined to comply. 
Consequently, the research concluded: „How someone responds to authority, whether 
with deference or defiance, becomes a, if not the, salient factor in subsequent 
authoritative assessments and decisions, more important potentially than the initial 
behaviour itself.‟117  
                                                 
114
 Simester and von Hirsch, n 107 above, 180; and P. Ramsay, „What is anti-social behaviour?‟ [2004] 
Criminal Law Review, 908, 920. 
115
 Similar findings have been noted in relation to longer-standing discretionary police powers, such as 
s.5 of the Public Order Act 1986, see D. Brown and T. Ellis, Policing low-level disorder (London: 
Home Office, 1994). 
116
 T. R. Tyler „The psychology of legitimacy: A relational perspective on voluntary deference to 
authorities‟ (1997) 1 Personality and Social Psychology Review, 323-345; and J. Sunshine and T. R. 
Tyler „The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing‟ (2003) 
37 Law & Society Review 513. 
117
 Crawford and Lister, n 7 above, 66, emphasis in original. 
 37 
There are dangers that directions to disperse become an „attitude test‟ whereby 
individuals that fail are met with an escalation of response.
118
 Subsequent arrests may 
arise as a direct result of the circumstances of the police encounter rather than any 
anti-social behaviour committed by groups gathering in public. Whilst the evidence to 
date does not show that large numbers of people are being criminalised by failure to 
comply with dispersal directions, the potential to do so remains. Young people who 
frequent public spaces and engage in „street-life‟ constitute „easy pickings‟ for police 
attention, notably under pressures of meeting targets for the number of „offences 
brought to justice‟. By focusing police attention on what the former Chair of the 
Youth Justice Board described as „low hanging fruit‟,119 dispersal orders may not only 
serve to stigmatise and label whole groups of youths but also lower the threshold at 
which young people come to the attention of the police and subsequently other 
agencies.  
 
Summary justice 
In keeping with other anti-social behaviour powers, dispersal orders cede considerable 
discretion and quasi-judicial decision-making authority to non-judicial officers, 
notably police and council staff, including the power to authorise an area for the 
purpose of the legislation. They facilitate and reflect a broader drift towards 
„summary justice‟ in recent years, an element of which is a de-juridification of 
decision-making. Decisions that might have been taken by courts are increasingly 
being taken elsewhere. This has been most evident in the expansion, and expanded 
enforcement, of fixed penalty notices for disorder. Originally introduced by the 
Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, PNDs are now available for 16 and 17 year 
olds.
120
 Schemes for their use in relation to 10-16 year olds have been piloted in seven 
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police force areas, with a view to extension across the country. The fact that police 
community support officers, as well as local authority officers and „accredited 
persons‟, can enforce PNDs has served to increase their use. In 2006/07, the number 
of PNDs issued across England and Wales rose to approximately 125,000, 
constituting some 9 per cent of all detections.
121
 Allied to this has been an increase in 
the powers of police officers to impose on-the-spot quasi-judicial decisions and 
directions with breach being a criminal offence, of which dispersal orders are a 
notable example. Current proposals to introduce „deferred PNDs‟, whereby payment 
of the financial penalty is suspended for up to six months on condition that the 
individual signs an „acceptable behaviour contract‟ setting out terms designed to 
regulate their behaviour in both a preventive and precautionary manner, appear set to 
extend this trend.
122
 The intention is that if the agreement is not fulfilled, the PND 
would then be „reactivated‟ for the original offence. As a „voluntary agreement‟, 
conditions attached to acceptable behaviour contracts can be both extensive and 
highly intrusive, including exclusions from visiting specified places and/or meeting 
certain people.
123
 Accordingly, they reflect the broader micro-management of 
individual behaviour heralded by diverse new forms of „contractual governance‟.124 
Dispersal orders also expose the way in which new powers have been 
introduced initially as exceptional, by way of being time-limited or area-based, only 
for them later to become routine aspects of policing. This normalisation of 
exceptional powers is evidenced in the manner in which designated public places 
orders,
125
 which provide police with powers within controlled drinking zones, have 
been supplemented and extended by new police powers under section 27 of the 
Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006. These allow police officers to give directions to 
leave a locality for up to 48 hours to someone aged 16 or over who is believed to be 
likely to cause or to contribute to the occurrence of alcohol-related crime or disorder 
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in that locality, without the need for prior designation. These powers dramatically 
extend the logic of dispersal orders by normalising their use. Not only is there no 
requirement for prior authorisation in relation to an identified area where there has 
been a history of such behaviour, and hence no consultation or agreement on the part 
of the local authority, but the powers also extend to individuals and the exclusion 
period is twice as long as that available in relation to dispersal orders. In addition, the 
new powers give police constables the discretion to determine the location and scope 
of the area from which an individual or group is to be excluded.
126
 Hence, most of the 
safeguards apparent in the dispersal order and designated public places order are 
swept aside. As well as creating extensive challenges for the police to enforce such 
directions, the new powers dramatically extend the reach of two-step prohibitions and 
the logic of preventive exclusions, whilst handing police officers far-reaching 
discretion, in situations where it is not necessary for a crime to have been committed. 
There are direct analogies here with the proposals in the government‟s 
consultation paper Strengthening Powers to Tackle Anti-Social Behaviour, published 
in late 2006, to introduce new front-line powers to prevent and deter anti-social 
behaviour. If introduced, these would normalise dispersal powers with regard to 
general anti-social behaviour by allowing police to disperse individuals without the 
need for any prior designation of a given area.
127
 The consultation also mooted 
extending the period of exclusion beyond the current 24 hours.
128
  
This developmental trend in the use of anti-social behaviour powers is further 
evidence of „counter-law‟ in which exceptional powers have been introduced as the 
thin end of a subsequently broader wedge, in part to disarm opposition. Not only does 
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this incremental process potentially evade strong objections by introducing change 
through a gradual and incremental process, but it also means that initial safeguards, 
protections and due process considerations are gradually watered down. Thus, the 
authorisation process required for dispersal order designation, initially seen as 
providing crucial procedural legitimacy and an evidence-base for the powers, in a 
short space of time has come to be seen (by the same government that introduced 
them), as a restriction that unduly hampers front-line police officers.
129
 Yet the 
research evidence suggests that the benefits that may accrue to dispersal orders derive 
more explicitly from the partnership, problem-solving and diversionary activities 
initiated through the pre-authorisation consultation process than from the use of the 
powers per se.
130
 If anything, the research evidence points to the need to strengthen 
the authorisation process by justifying the evidence-base and the proportionality of 
the exceptional response, raising the threshold to where there is a history of „serious‟, 
as well as „persistent and significant‟, anti-social behaviour (in line with the Scottish 
legislation) and requiring extensive consultation and diversionary activities to 
accompany authorisation.
131
 Ultimately, a rigorous process of authorisation provides 
the subsequent designation, powers and associated initiatives with crucial procedural 
legitimacy and public accountability, and constitutes the reasoned basis upon which 
local deliberations about long-term strategies can be founded. However, according to 
the government consultation paper, this key procedural bulwark is now seemingly 
perceived as a hindrance. 
 
Conclusion 
Government hyper-activity in creating new regulatory technologies and legal 
prohibitions to tackle anti-social behaviour – as well as, subsequently, extending and 
supplementing these – has advanced at such a frenetic pace as to leave little space for 
considered reflection on the normative and social implications of legal reforms or 
their effectiveness in regulating behaviour.
132
 This article has gone some way to 
drawing together an assessment of both legal developments and empirical research 
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findings in relation to one particularly controversial, but little discussed, instrument in 
the new regulatory tool-kit: the dispersal order. Dispersal powers are important not 
only for the considerable infringements on the rights of individuals to free movement 
and assembly that they entail, but also because their genesis and development reflects 
broader and more fundamental shifts in regulating troublesome behaviour and 
incivilities. In the preceding discussion, I have sought to show how much of the 
appeal of dispersal orders derives from their communicative properties and symbolic 
representations as signifiers of local state action, rather than from their instrumental 
capacity to regulate behaviour. However, as the research highlights, in reality these 
messages are often mixed and contradictory. Frequently, the meanings invested in 
dispersal order designation are both confused and subject to misinterpretation. As 
such, dispersal orders often provoked a „communication battle‟ in which the 
manipulation of appearances becomes almost more important than the impact of 
policing and allied activities on the ground. Moreover, the messages implied are 
differently interpreted by diverse interests within localities in ways that can increase 
inter-group and inter-generational misunderstandings and tensions. In this vein, 
policing and enforcement-led solutions to problems of order can serve to heighten 
levels of anxiety and solidify lines of difference between groups within given 
localities. Dispersal powers, of themselves, invariably fail to address the wider causes 
of perceived anti-social behaviour or address long-term issues of disorder, providing 
little more than a degree of localised respite through intensive policing. 
The evidence suggests that dispersal powers may end up being counter-
productive by: falsely raising local expectations over policing priorities; alienating 
young people who feel unfairly discriminated against and stigmatised by such powers; 
and drawing some young people (at an earlier stage) into adversarial relations with 
local police. It is reassuring, therefore, that the research reveals that police officers 
and local authority staff offered some of the most critical and reflective insights into 
the shortcomings of the powers and the challenges they entail. Through practice, 
many have come to appreciate both the limitations and the unintended consequences 
of such sweeping and highly discretionary prohibitions. As a consequence, there is a 
growing realisation of the need to retain such exceptional powers for focused, short-
term and well-evidenced use. It may be that this growing awareness is reflected in the 
reduced use of the powers in England and Wales in 2005/06 as compared to the 
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previous year.
133
 However, the ambiguities apparent in the implementation of 
dispersal orders are a product of ill-considered and „difficult‟ law, the impact of which 
the government in England and Wales has preferred not to evaluate in any rigorous 
manner. Following the lead of the Scottish Government,
134
 the time has come to 
conduct a major review of the direction, impact and social implications of the anti-
social behaviour agenda and the swathe of allied powers that it has generated, before 
too much damage is inflicted upon local social relations, a generation of young people 
and cherished principles of civil liberties.  
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